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INTERNATIONAL MONEY LAUNDERING AND U.S. 
LAW: A NEED TO "KNOW-YOUR-PARTNER" 
Marian Hagler* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Every day, U.S. businesses enter into international transactions 
with new partners in the form of joint ventures, financings, investments, 
licensing, supply, purchase, and other arrangements. What do they 
know about these new partners? In some instances, these new partners 
may be well-known companies, which are publicly-traded and watched 
by professional analysts and rating agencies. In many instances, little 
may be known about them. They may be small or newly-established. 
They also may be located in new markets, where there is limited 
experience or expertise. 
During negotiations, significant attention is paid to the merits of 
the business relationship itself (price, capability, compatibility, synergy, 
competitive advantage, etc.). Questions of reputation and integrity are 
more difficult and awkward to investigate. Extensive background 
checks and investigative "due diligence" can also be costly, disruptive 
and, ultimately, unhelpful in unearthing criminal activity or association 
and other questions of reputation, ethics, and business practice. 
Clearly, transactions with organizations engaged in criminal 
activity bring harm to one's reputation. They may also result in serious 
civil and criminal liability for organizations and individuals subject to 
U.S. money laundering laws. These laws seek to punish persons who 
do business with criminals and thereby help them utilize the proceeds 
of their unlawful activity. The money laundering laws of the United 
States are known to be the toughest in the world and call for stiff 
penalties, including fines, confinement, and asset forfeiture. 1 
The problem of "knowing your partner" is perhaps most acute in 
emerging markets. There, accurate and unbiased information is usually 
difficult to find. Corruption may be commonplace, and standard 
business practices may include some violations of local law. Moreover, 
if the banking system and financial services industries in the emerging 
* Adjunct Professor, Georgetown University Law Center, and a partner of Coudert Brothers 
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like to acknowledge the assistance of Lina Braude, Associate, Coudert Brothers LLP, 
Washington, D.C., for her extensive assistance in preparing this article. 
1. 18 U.S.C. § 1956 (a)(l)(B)(ii), (2)(B)(ii) (2004). 
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market are not adequately regulated or monitored, they may become 
cozy homes for the transfer and laundering of funds by organized 
criminals and terrorists. 
Such concerns inspired certain provisions of the USA PA TRI OT 
Act ("Patriot Act").2 In addition to increasing surveillance authority for 
law enforcement and imposing new internal compliance measures for 
banks and other financial institutions, the Patriot Act also expanded the 
money laundering laws in three key respects that affect international 
business transactions. As more fully described below, the Patriot Act: 
(1) clarified that "foreign persons" are subject to civil asset seizures and 
forfeitures;3 (2) expanded the law to cover money laundering 
transactions made through foreign banks;4 and (3) extended the list of 
predicate offenses to include, most notably, any foreign corruption,5 
whereas previously such corruption had to amount to a violation of the 
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act ("FCPA").6 
U.S. money laundering laws are themselves broad and, as the 
discussion below will illustrate, lacking some technical coherency. 
Many key issues relating to their scope are undefined, lack guidance 
from case law, and rest on artificial distinctions. Breadth and ambiguity 
makes circumvention of these laws difficult, thereby facilitating the 
efforts of the Department of Justice ("DOJ") to use them to fight 
international organized crime and terrorist financing. Moreover, the 
same concepts that are embodied in U.S. law are also included, or slated 
for inclusion, in the laws of other countries.7 The U.S. government also 
has had some success in its effort to bring about greater international 
enforcement. These efforts, together with developments in money 
laundering case law, demonstrate that the range of activities captured by 
money laundering legislation is likely to grow, both in the U.S. and 
abroad. In particular, recently, U.S. case law has established that 
foreign tax evasion may form the basis of wire fraud, a predicate 
2. Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to 
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT Act) Act of 2001, P.L. 107-56 (Oct. 26, 
2001). 
3. See 18 U.S.C. § 1956(b)(2) (2004). 
4. See id. § 1956(c)(6)(B) (extending the term "financial institution" to include any 
"foreign bank"). 
5. See id. § 1956(c)(7)(B)(iv) (" ... an offense against a foreign nation 
involving ... bribery of a public official, or the misappropriation, theft or embezzlement of 
public funds by or for the benefit of a public official"). 
6. See generally 15 U.S.C. § 78dd (2004). 
7. See Council of Europe Convention, No. 141, on Laundering, Search, Seizure and 
Confiscation of the Proceeds of Crime, Nov. 8, 1990, available at 
http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/En/Treaties/html/141.htm (last visited Mar. 25, 2004). 
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offense for purposes of money laundering.8 In addition, U.S. money 
laundering laws may reach a U.S. citizen who transfers funds between 
two other countries even if he or she commits the offense while located 
offshore, or a foreign citizen who orders the transfer of funds into or out 
of the United States while abroad.9 Accordingly, while present law is 
technical in nature, little comfort should be drawn from any perceived 
gaps or safe harbors that such technicalities may create. Rather, the 
breadth and ambiguity of the law create risks for legitimate business 
seeking to explore new markets and new opportunities with new 
partners. 
This article seeks to draw attention to the importance of 
understanding and mitigating the risks associated with the broad sweep 
of U.S. money laundering laws for persons pursuing new business 
relationships, such as new ventures in emerging markets. This article 
first examines the technical aspects of U.S. money laundering laws in 
the context of international transactions, and then provides 
recommendations for measured due diligence and other steps that work 
to reduce exposure to them by complying with the law's implicit "know 
your partner" requirement. 
For purposes of illustration, this article uses the example of a 
company organized or based in the United States (the "U.S. parent") 
contemplating a foreign project (the "international project") with a new 
partner located in an emerging market (the "new foreign partner"). The 
U.S. parent may participate directly or through a company that it 
controls in Europe (the "European subsidiary"). The officers, directors, 
and employees of the U.S. parent, the European subsidiary, and the new 
foreign parent involved in the international project (the "employees") 
will include U.S. citizens, resident aliens, and others. 
II. ANALYSIS 
Generally speaking, liability under U.S. money laundering laws 
attaches if (a) an offense that is recognized as a predicate offense for 
money laundering in the United States is committed, (b) the proceeds of 
such offense are used in a transaction, and ( c) the defendant participated 
in the transaction knowing, or being willfully blind to the fact, that such 
proceeds were derived from unlawful activity. 10 To some degree, the 
8. See infra text accompanying notes 76-102. 
9. See infra text accompanying notes 24, 52-57. 
10. See generally OTTO G. 0BERMAIER & ROBERT G. MORVILLO, WHITE COLLAR 
CRIME: BUSINESS AND REGULATORY OFFENSES (2003); Daniel H. April and Angelo M. 
Grasso, Money Laundering, 38 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 839 (2002); Christopher Boran, Money 
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extent to which the defendant also intended, or knew that the perpetrator 
of the offense intended, to use the transaction to disguise and conceal 
the source of the proceeds will also be relevant. Almost all felonies 
committed wholly or partly in the United States for money or other 
commercially-useable resource (such as murder-for-hire, drug 
trafficking, larceny, bribery, wire fraud, etc.) are recognized as predicate 
offenses for the purposes of money laundering. 
There are several statutes that prohibit money laundering and 
related offenses under Title 18 of the United States Code. This article 
will focus on Sections 1956 (money laundering) and 1957 ("money 
spending," i.e., monetary transactions in property derived from unlawful 
activity), which are similar in content and application. In addition, 
some transactions may also run afoul of Sections 2314 (transportation 
of stolen money), and 1962 ("RICO"). There are also statutes 
criminalizing conspiracy to commit money laundering (Section 
1956(h)), and aiding and abetting any of the foregoing crimes (Section 
2). To the extent the defendant also committed, facilitated, or otherwise 
was involved in the predicate offense itself (e.g. mail or wire fraud or an 
FCPA violation), a prosecution for money laundering may include these 
charges as well. 
Most U.S. money laundering indictments are brought against the 
same individual who perpetrated the underlying (predicate) crime (e.g., 
the drug dealer who attempts to launder the proceeds of his crime). In 
addition, there is a significant body of cases brought against persons 
who, in some way, wittingly helped the perpetrator utilize, dispose of, 
or launder his proceeds (e.g., the bank, the courier, the merchant, or the 
lawyer). Applying this principle to the illustration, if the new foreign 
partner contributes ill-gotten assets to the international project, there is 
potential money laundering liability not only for him, but also for any 
other person (individual or corporate entity) participating in the 
international project, such as the U.S. parent, the European subsidiary, 
and the employees, depending on what they knew. 
Extraterritorial Jurisdiction of US. Money Laundering Statutes 
Because most of the activity concerning the international project is 
likely to be conducted outside the United States, it is important to 
consider first, to what extent may U.S. money laundering laws be 
applied extraterritorially to non-U.S. persons (e.g., the foreign 
Laundering, 40 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 847 (2003); William G. Phelps, Validity, Construction 
and Application of 18 U.S.C.A . 1956, which Criminalizes Money Laundering, 121 A.LR. 
FED. 525 (2004). 
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employees, the new foreign partner, and the international project 
company), or to conduct by U.S. persons (e.g., the U.S. employees, the 
U.S. parent, and the European subsidiary) occurring abroad? 
Generally, U.S. money laundering laws may be applied 
extraterritorially to actions of U.S. persons abroad and to actions of non-
U.S. persons undertaken inside, or partially inside, the United States.11 
However, the U.S. has faced criticism for the extension of its criminal 
prosecutions to activities occurring principally abroad. Prior to 
commencing grand jury investigations or returning an indictment based 
solely on extraterritorial jurisdiction, prosecutors must receive approval 
of the Asset Forfeiture and Money Laundering Section of the criminal 
division of the DOJ. 12 The prosecutorial decision includes weighing the 
seriousness of the predicate crime committed, the degree of a 
defendant's involvement, the effect on, or connection to, the United 
States, and the availability of evidence. 
Although applied similarly, Sections 1956 and 1957 have certain 
technical distinctions creating some ambiguity with respect to their 
coverage. Specifically, extraterritorial jurisdiction for Section 1956 
depends on whether the defendant is a "U.S. citizen", whether conduct 
occurs at least "in part" in the United States and whether over $10,000 
is involved: 
There is extraterritorial jurisdiction over the conduct prohibited by this 
section if-
(1) the conduct is by a United States citizen or, in the case of a non-
United States citizen, the conduct occurs in part in the United States; 
and 
(2) the transaction or series of transactions involved funds or monetary 
instruments of a value exceeding $10,000.13 
By contrast, extraterritorial jurisdiction under § 1957 depends on 
whether the defendant falls within a broad, but technical definition of a 
"U.S. person": 
that the offense under this section takes place outside the United States 
and [the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United 
States], but the defendant is a United States person (as defined in 
section 3077 of this title, but excluding the class described in 
11. In this context, "U.S. persons" are generally, U.S. citizens and residents, and 
companies organized within the United States and their foreign subsidiaries. 
12. OBERMAIER & MORVILLO, supra note 10 § 2A.04[1] (citing DOJ MANUAL § 9-
105.300). 
13. 18 u.s.c. § 1956(f) (2004). 
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paragraph (2)(D) of such section). 14 
Section 3077 of Title 18 (excluding paragraph (2)(D)) defines "United 
States person" as: 
(A) a national of the United States as defined in section 10l(a)(22) of 
the Immigration and Nationality Act; 
(B) an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence in the United 
States as defined in section 101(a)(20) of the Immigration and 
Nationality Act; 
(C) any person within the United States; ... 
(E) a sole proprietorship, partnership, company, or association 
composed principally of nationals or permanent resident aliens of the 
United States; and 
(F) a corporation organized under the laws of the United States, any 
State, the District of Columbia, or any territory or possession of the 
United States, and a foreign subsidiary of such corporation. 15 
The term "foreign subsidiary" is undefined by statute or relevant 
case law. Consistent with the broad sweep of Section 3077(2), the DOJ 
and the courts may apply the term as liberally as necessary to prevent 
circumvention with a focus on whether the U.S. corporation effectively 
controlled the activities of the foreign entity. Accordingly, in our 
example, the European subsidiary should qualify, and the international 
project company may qualify, as a "U.S. person" for purposes of 
establishing jurisdiction over their actions taken outside the United 
States. In addition, under Section 3077(2)(E), foreign companies may 
qualify as U.S. persons if "composed principally of' U.S. nationals or 
residents. 16 
These differences create at least three noteworthy points of 
distinction. 
Transactional Amount 
First, Sections 1956 and 1957 specify $10,000, as a threshold 
14. 18 u.s.c. § 1957(d) (2004). 
15. Id.§ 3077(2). "The term 'national of the United States' means: (A) a citizen of the 
United States, or (B) a person who, though not a citizen of the United States, owes 
permanent allegiance to the United States." 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(22) (2004). "The term 
lawfully admitted for permanent residence means: the status of having been lawfully 
accorded the privilege of residing permanently in the United States as an immigrant in 
accordance with the immigration laws, such status not having changed." Id. § 1101(a)(20). 
16. 18 U.S.C. § 3077(2)(E) (2004). 
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transactional amount, but Section 1957 lacks specific reference to the 
possibility of aggregating a series of transactions in order to reach such 
threshold amount, as is expressly permitted by Section 1956.17 Courts 
have applied the principle of lenity to find that Section 1957 requires 
each transaction to be greater than $10,000. 18 Accordingly, in 
prosecuting offenders who have structured their business arrangements 
as a series of transactions under the $10,000 threshold, prosecutors may 
rely on jurisdiction under Section 1956, although the DOJ continues to 
believe that there may be exceptions to the non-aggregation rule under 
Section 1957.19 
Applicability of Criminal Liability to Foreign Legal Entities and 
Organizations 
Second, while Sections 1956 and 1957 apply domestically to 
"whoever" commits the offense, be it an individual, corporation, or 
other organization, the extraterritorial subsection of Section 1956 
(subsection ( f) ), refers only to "United States citizen" and "non-United 
States citizen" as within its ambit. 20 It is not clear whether the use of 
these terms was intended to suggest that the extraterritorial jurisdiction 
of Section 1956 should apply onlri to individuals, as opposed to 
corporations or other organizations. 1 By contrast, Section 1957( d) 
17. See 18 U.S.C. § 1957(a)(2004). 
18. United States v. Jenkins, 58 F.3d 611, 613 (11th Cir. 1995); accord United States v. 
Brown, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 12310 at 11 (4th Cir. 1998) (following Jenkins, but finding 
that a lump sum payment for several automobiles each of which was valued at less than 
$10,000 qualified as a single transaction). 
19. See GREDD ET AL., MONEY LAUNDERING, § 2A.03[3], Citing DOJ MANUAL § 9-
105A.OOO at 281-82 (suggesting that if "several transactions are so closely related as to 
constitute phases or divisions of a single transaction, the property may be aggregated for 
purposes of charging a single violation of § 1957[, t]he purchase of an automobile in 
installments totaling over $10,000 [being] an obvious example of this"). Id. 
20. See United States v. Peterson, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 20336 (6th Cir. 1999), citing 
United States v. Carter, 311F.2d934, 941-42 (6th Cir. 1963) and Continental Baking Co. v. 
United States, 281 F.2d 137, 149 (6th Cir. 1960). "[A] corporation, through the conduct of 
its agents and employees, may be convicted of a crime, including a crime involving 
knowledge and [willfulness]. .. [if] its officer's or agent's illegal conduct be related to and 
done within the course of his employment and have some connection with the furtherance of 
the business of such corporation." Peterson, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 20336, at "'*12. 
21. The term "United States citizen" is not defined in section 1956(t), but is 
encountered elsewhere in the United States Code, in contexts often (but not always) 
referring only to individuals. See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 552a; 8 U.S.C. § 1101; 10 U.S.C. § 
1060a(g)(2); 15 U.S.C. § 713c-3; but see, e.g., 49 U.S.C. § 40102(15) (defining ''citizen of 
the United States" as including certain legal entities, for purposes of carriers of air 
transportation); 46 U.S.C. § 802 (defining "citizen" of the United States as including certain 
legal entities, for purposes of shipping). According to legislative history, the purpose of § 
1956(t) is to ensure that extraterritorial applications are limited to significant cases in 
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makes no reference to "citizen," and, for purposes of civil liability, 
Section 1956 (b) clearly applies to any "person" including foreign 
banks.22 
Interestingly, research reveals no reported cases applying 
extraterritorial jurisdiction under Sections 1956(t) or 1957(d) other than 
to individuals. Prosecution of legal entities organized and operating 
abroad would appear to be problematic for a variety of reasons (e.g., the 
availability of evidence). However, there is no legislative history, 
precedent, or apparent rationale for limiting the extraterritorial 
application of U.S. money laundering laws to individuals. 
Sufficiency of Conduct Occurring Only Partly in the United States 
Third, Section 1956(t) requires that the conduct of a non-United 
States citizen occur at least "in part" in the United States.23 This does 
not, however, mean that the defendant must have been physically 
present within U.S. borders at some point during the commission of the 
offense. In United States v. Stein, the district court found that a foreign 
citizen who causes or orders a transfer of proceeds from or to the United 
States by telephone or other means while abroad is deemed to have 
acted "in" the United States for purposes of Section 1956(t).24 
Similarly, with respect to civil liability, Section 1956(b)(2) focuses not 
operating wholly abroad from U.S. laws. See generally United States v. Stein, 1994 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 8471 at 12-14 (E.D. La. 1994), citing S. Rep. No. 99-433 at 14; Trujillo v. 
Banco Central del Ecuador, 35 F.Supp. 2d 908 (S.D.Fl. 1998), citing S. Rep. No. 99-433, at 
14. No mention is made of a desire to protect U.S. corporations from liability while 
operating abroad. 
22. As a result of the Patriot Act, section 1956 now provides specifically for civil 
liability for foreign financial institutions and other "foreign persons" (see infra text 
accompanying notes 39-41 below). One may view this change in law as an effort by 
Congress either to close the apparent gap and, thus, reaffirming the applicability of section 
1956 to foreign entities, or to clarify that foreign entities bear at least civil liability for their 
acts in violation of section 1956. 
23. 18 u.s.c. § 1956(f) (2004). 
24. United States v. Stein; No. 93-375-Sec. "N'', 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8471, at *13-
14 (E.D. La. 1994). "[S]ection 1956 was not intended to only apply when the defendant acts 
within the borders of this country. Rather it was intended to reach situations in which 'the 
transaction occurred in whole or in part in the United States,"' citing S. Rep. No. 99-433, at 
14. "It is the entire transaction that forms the offense conduct, not merely its initiation or 
conclusion." Id. "If, as it is alleged in this case, a defendant, who never enters this country, 
initiates a transfer of funds from a place within the United States to place outside the United 
States, there will be extraterritorial jurisdiction, because a portion of the conduct occurred in 
this country." Id.; see also United States v. Approximately $25,829,681.80 in Funds, No. 98 
Civ. 2682, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18499 (S.D.N.Y. 1999), aff'd, 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 
2994 (2d Cir. 2003) (following Stein and finding that wire transfers activated from abroad 
that caused a transfer of funds from the United States constitutes conduct "occurring in part 
in the United States" for purposes of§ 1956(f)). 
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on whether any of defendant's "conduct" occurred in the United States, 
but rather whether any part of the "financial transaction" occurred in the 
United States.25 Thus, a defendant may be convicted under Section 
1956 when acting wholly abroad if he causes the transfer of funds or 
other property to or from the United States. 
By contrast, Section 1957 focuses on whether the offense occurred 
"in" the United States (in which case, anyone is liable) or abroad (in 
which case, only "U.S. persons" are liable).26 Again, no helpful case 
law on this point was found; therefore, what is meant by "in" the United 
States under Section 1957( d), as distinct from "in part" in the United 
States under Section 1957(f), is unclear. One might conclude that 
Stein's conduct would not be covered by Section 1957. Moreover, 
because Section 1957 requires the offense, arguably as a whole, to occur 
in the United States (as opposed to merely the conduct, constituting a 
component of the offense to occur at least partly in the United States), 
its application to non-U.S. persons with respect to conduct or a 
transaction occurring partly abroad may be more problematic. 
Summary of Extraterritorial Jurisdiction 
Based on the foregoing and despite certain limitations and 
uncertain distinctions, the extraterritorial jurisdiction of U.S. money 
laundering laws is potentially quite broad. Moreover, although 
heretofore relatively infrequently exercised, geopolitical mandates and 
circumstances are likely to inspire their greater use. A matrix of 
potential criminal liability is set forth as Table 1. 
Table 1 
DEFENDANT 
An entity that is a "U.S. person," i.e., 
(1) an entity organized or operating 
within the United States, or (2) a 
foreign subsidiary of a corporation 
organized in the United States, or (3) 
an entity "composed principally of 
national or permanent resident aliens 
o the United States " 
25. 18 U.S.C. § 1956(b)(2). 
26. 18 U.S.C. § 1957. 
PLACE OF 
§ 1956 § 1957 
CONDUCT 
CRIMINAL CRIMINAL 
LIABILITY? LIABILITY? 
in the United Yes Yes 
States 
outside the Unclear Yes 
United States 
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any other entity or organization 
an individual who is a U.S. citizen 
an individual who is not a U.S. citizen 
but who is a resident alien or other 
U.S. person 
an individual who is none of the above 
outside the No 
United States 
in the United Yes 
States 
outside the Yes 
United States 
in the United Yes 
States 
outside the No 
United States 
in the United Yes 
States 
[Vol. 31 :2 
No 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
As Table 1 shows, in many instances, both Sections 1956 and 1957 
capture extraterritorial conduct and, in some instances, where the 
applicability of Section 1956 extraterritorially is not available or 
unclear, Section 1957 is clearly applicable (e.g., conduct by entities 
constituting "U.S. persons" under Section 3077(2) oftitle 18, or conduct 
by resident aliens who are not U.S. citizens).28 In short, the 
circumstances where there is clearly no liability under either statute are 
narrow: 
27. See, e.g., United States v. Tronson, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 10786 at 5 (6th Cir. 
2000) (holding that a money laundering conviction under section 1956 was proper against a 
foreign citizen defendant when it was shown that part of the conduct occurred in the United 
States); United States v. Sadighi, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 27994 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding that 
telephone calls to a co-conspirator U.S. citizen in the United States, as well as bank transfers 
from abroad to the United States was sufficient for extraterritorial jurisdiction over foreign 
citizen for conspiracy to commit money laundering under section 1956(h)). 
28. 18 u.s.c. § 3077(2) (2004). 
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• A foreign entity that does not qualify as a "U.S. person" is 
not liable for conduct occurring wholly abroad. 
• An individual who is neither a resident alien nor a citizen 
of the United States is not liable for conduct occurring 
wholly abroad. 
At the same time, textual differences between Sections 1956 and 
1957 create some uncertainty. Specifically, 
• Extraterritorial liability under Section 1956 may apply only 
to individuals.29 
• Section 1957 does note clarify whether it applies to 
offenses occurring only "partly" in the United States.30 
• Section 1957 does not expressly permit aggregation of 
related transactions to reach the $10,000 jurisdictional 
threshold. 31 
• Section 1957 only applies to transactions conducted 
through a financial institution. 32 
• Section 1956 only applies to transactions involving 
"monetary instruments" and "funds."33 
These distinctions create the following unintended potential 
prosecutorial gaps: 
• Prosecution of a foreign organization that is not a "U.S. 
person" for conduct occurring only partly in the United 
States; 
• Prosecution of anyone (except a U.S. citizen) for an offense 
occurring wholly abroad and either (a) not involving a 
financial institution or (b) involving transactions less than 
$10,000 each in value. 
• Prosecution of a non-U.S. person for a transaction not 
involving monetary instruments or funds (e.g., a barter of 
goods) occurring only partly in the United States. 
Although these and other nuances exist in the text of the law, one 
should be cautioned that they are not safe harbors, as there would 
appear to be no clear rationale, policy, or other basis for them. 
29. See supra text accompanying notes 19-22. 
30. See supra text accompanying notes 23-26. 
31. See supra text accompanying notes 15-18. 
32. See infra text accompanying notes 66-67. 
33. See supra text accompanying note 13. 
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Penalties 
Criminal Penalties 
For each count of money laundering under Section 1956, the 
maximum penalties are significant - twenty years of confinement and a 
fine of $500,000 or, if greater, up to twice the defendant's gross gain (or 
the victim's gross loss) if not unduly complicating the case.34 Penalties 
under Section 1957 are similar - the maximum confinement period per 
count is ten years, and the same maximum fines apply. 35 
Each instance of a defendant's participation in any transaction or 
transfer of tainted funds could constitute one count of money 
laundering, conspiracy to commit money laundering, or aiding and 
abetting money laundering. These counts could multiply quickly in an 
investment situation. By way of illustration, the U.S. parent or 
European subsidiary might participate in the initial investment by the 
new foreign partner through project and investment agreements. An 
employee might authorize or otherwise participate in the utilization of 
such funds in payments to third party contractors. Each transaction or 
other instance of participation could also trigger additional (non-
multiplicitous) liability under other statutes. Thus, the penalties could 
add up, as numerous transactions and transfers occur. 
Civil Penalties 
A civil penalty of $10,000 or the value of the funds involved 
(whichever is feater) may also be applied for each violation of Section 
1956 or 1957. 6 In addition, the DOJ may commence a civil forfeiture 
proceeding against the illicit proceeds of a foreign legal entity involved 
in money laundering if such proceeds are in the United States.37 In one 
such case, the assets of a Russian Bank (Sobinbank) were held in a civil 
forfeiture proceeding on the theory that Sobinbank was knowingly 
involved in a money laundering scheme in violation of Section 1956. 38 
The Sobinbank case was apparently a rare instance of the DOJ 
proceeding against a foreign bank's correspondent account under a 
Section 1956 theory, and the first time it did so based on the predicate 
34. 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(l)(B)(ii), (2)(B)(ii) (2004); see also 18 U.S.C. § 3571(d) 
(2004). 
35. 18 U.S.C. § 1957(b)(2) (2004). 
36. 18 u.s.c. § 1956(b)(l) (2004). 
37. 18 u.s.c. § 981 (2004). 
38. United States v. $15,270,885.69 Formerly on Deposit in Account No. 8900261137, 
2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12602 (S.D.N.Y. 2000). 
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crime of wire fraud involving a scheme to defraud a foreign government 
oftaxes.39 
In October 2001, Section 1956(b ), providing a civil cause of action 
by the government against any person who commits a money 
laundering offense, was amended by Section 317 of the Patriot Act to 
give clearer long-arm jurisdiction over such foreign money launderers.40 
Section 1956(b) now permits the government to bring a civil suit against 
a foreign person, including a foreign bank, that committed a money 
laundering offense but could not be found in the United States. Further, 
the Section also provides that the court has jurisdiction if the money 
laundering offense occurred in part in the United States, or the foreign 
bank has a correspondent account in the United States.41 
Specifically, Section 1956(b )(2) provides: 
(2) Jurisdiction over foreign persons. For purposes of adjudicating an 
action filed or enforcing a penalty ordered under this section, the 
district courts shall have jurisdiction over any foreign person. 
including any financial institution authorized under the laws of a 
foreign countrv, against whom the action is brought, if service of 
process upon the foreign person is made under the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure or the laws of the country in which the foreign person 
is found, and-
(A) the foreign person commits an offense under subsection (a) 
involving a financial transaction that occurs in whole or in part in the 
United States; 
(B) the foreign person converts, to his or her own use, property in 
which the United States has an ownership interest by virtue of the 
entry of an order of forfeiture by a court of the United States; or 
(C) the foreign person is a financial institution that maintains a bank 
account at a financial institution in the United States.42 
Although the term "foreign person" is not defined, it clearly includes 
financial institutions. Accordingly, application to other foreign legal 
entities and organizations would appear contemplated (or, at least, the 
argument is stronger with respect to the term "foreign person" than the 
term "citizen" used in Section 1956(f)). In this respect, the activities of 
39. See "Court Approves Use of Laundering Law to Attack Foreign Tax Evasion," 
Money Laundering Alert, Nov. 2000, at 
http://www.moneylaundering.com/ ArticleDisplay .aspx?id= 17 54) (requires subscription). 
40. Patriot Act, supra note 2, § 31 7. 
41. 18 U.S.C. § 1956(b)(2)(A), (C), as amended by Patriot Act, supra note 2, § 317. 
42. 18 U.S.C. § 1956(b)(2) (2004) (emphasis added). 
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the European subsidiary, the international project company, and even 
foreign employees may be subject to civil penalty (even if they escape 
criminal liability under Section 1956(f)), if some aspect of the offending 
transaction occurred in the United States. 
Elements of Offenses 
Sections 1956 and 1957 of Title 18 of the United States Code 
prohibit various forms of money laundering. The potential offenses that 
are most relevant to business transactions with new partners are those 
offenses requiring only some form of knowledge as the requisite 
scienter.43 These include 
• Section 1956(a)(l)(B)(i) ("general laundering"), 
• Section 1956(a)(2)(B)(i) ("cross-border money 
laundering"), and 
• Section 1957(a) ("money spending"). 
They are all similar in content, as shown in Table 2. There is 
considerable overlap between Sections 1956 and 1957, and indictments 
often include more than one money laundering offense and more than 
one theory of money laundering. 
Table 2 
Elements 
of Offense 
1 
Conduct 
2 
Transaction 
General Money 
Laundering (§ 
1956 a 1 B 
The defendant 
conducted or 
attempted to 
conduct 
a "financial 
transaction" 
The defendant 
transmitted, 
transported or 
transferred, or 
attempted to 
transmit, transport, 
or transfer across the 
United States border 
a "monetary 
instrument or funds" 
Money 
Spending(§ 
1957 a 
(similar to 
General 
Money 
Laundering)44 
a "monetary 
transaction" 
43. Other forms of money laundering, not discussed in this article, focus on a 
defendant's intent, on activity intended to evade federal reporting requirements, on the 
transportation of funds into and out of the United States, and on sting operations. 
44. Section 1957 requires that the defendant "engages or attempts to engage in a 
monetary transaction." 18 U.S.C. § 1957(a) (2004). 
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3 that "involves" the (same as General (similar to 
Criminal proceeds of Money Laundering, General 
Proceeds "specified unlawful arguably implied)45 Money 
activity" Laundering)46 
4 knowing that the (same as General (similar to 
Knowledge funds were Money Laundering) General 
of Illegality proceeds of "some Money 
form of unlawful Laundering)47 
activity" 
5 and knowing that (same as General Not required 
Knowledge the transaction was Money Laundering) 
of Intent to designed to 
Conceal "conceal or 
disguise the nature, 
the location, the 
source, the 
ownership or the 
45. The requirement that the transaction actually involve proceeds of specified 
unlawful activity is generally viewed as implied. Section 1956(a)(2) requires either that the 
defendant acted "with the intent to promote the carrying on of specified unlawful activity" 
(subparagraph (A)) or that the defendant knew that the transfer was "designed in whole or in 
part ... to conceal or disguise ... the proceeds of specified unlawful activity" (subparagraph 
(B)(i)), subject to the exception that the latter knowledge test may be satisfied by a law 
enforcement sting operation. 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(2),(b)(i) (2004); See also OBERMAIER & 
MORVILLO, supra note 10, § 2A.02[2][d][ii] (2001) (noting that the DOJ recognizes that 
proof that the proceeds are from a specified unlawful activity is implicitly required, citing 
DOJ MANUAL§ 9-105A.OOO at 272). But see id. § 2A.02[2][d][i] (noting that because proof 
that the proceeds are from a specified unlawful activity is not expressly required, section 
1956(a)(2) is available for sting operations, in addition to section 1956(a)(3)). 
46. Section 1957 specifically requires that the monetary transaction be "in criminally 
derived property that is ... derived from specified unlawful activity." 18 U.S.C. § 1957(a) 
(2004). Case law supports the view that this is similar to the criminal proceeds test under 
Section 1956(a). See, e.g., United States v. Savage, 67 F.3d 1432 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding 
that "criminally derived property" under section 1957 is similar to "proceeds" under section 
1956); United States v. Cavin, 38 F.3d 1299 (5th Cir. 1994) (holding that payments were 
proceeds of criminal activity is an essential elements ofa section 1957(a) offense). 
4 7. Section 1957 specifically requires that the defendant "knowingly" engaged or 
attempted to engage in a monetary transaction in criminally derived property, and defines 
"criminally derived property" as "property constituting, or derived from, proceeds obtained 
from a criminal offense." 18 U.S.C. § 1957(f)(2) (2004). Section 1957(c) further clarifies 
that the State need not show that the defendant "knew that the offense from which the 
criminally derived property was derived was specified unlawful activity." 18 U.S.C. § 
1957(c) (2004). As with section 1956(a), this knowledge test focuses on the knowledge that 
the transaction involved proceeds of some form of unlawful activity. See United States v. 
Hawkey, 148 F.3d 920 (8th Cir. 1998). 
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In short, each statute is a slight variation on the same theme - the 
defendant in some way must participate in the transfer of assets that 
were the proceeds of a "specified unlawful activity," knowing or 
believing that the assets were the proceeds of "some form of unlawful 
activity." Section 1956 also requires that the defendant knew that the 
transfer was intended to conceal the source of the funds, while Section 
1957 requires that the transaction be in excess of $10,000. These 
elements and their differences are discussed in more detail below. 
Conduct 
Section 1956(a)(l) requires that a defendant "conducts or attempts 
to conduct" a transaction.49 Similarly, and without apparent distinction, 
Section 1957 focuses on whether a defendant "engages or attempts to 
engage in" a transaction. 50 Section 1956( c )(2) defines "conduct" 
broadly as including "initiating, concluding, or participating in 
initiating, or concluding a transaction."51 Thus, a defendant need not be 
a transferee or a recipient of the funds. Participation by the U.S. parent 
or the European subsidiary with the new foreign partner in the 
international project and the agreements forming the basis of the 
investment could constitute "conduct." In addition, employees could 
bear liability for their involvement in effecting the transfer or use of 
tainted funds or assets. 
In contrast to Sections 1956(a)(l) and 1957, Section 1956(a)(2) is 
limited to transfers and attempted transfers across a United States 
border. As a consequence, Section 1956(a)(2) sometimes is referred to 
as "international money laundering," while the general money 
laundering statute, Section 1956(a)(l), is often referred to as "domestic 
money laundering."52 However, these are misnomers. In actuality, 
Section 1956(a)(l) applies to generally to any money laundering, while 
Section 1956(a)(2) applies only to money laundering transactions that 
cross a U.S. border. 
48. Alternatively, instead of knowledge of intent to conceal, the State may show that 
the defendant acted "with intent to promote the carrying on of the specified unlawful 
activity." Compare 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(l)(B)(i) with 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(l)(A)(i). 
49. 18 U.S.C § 1956(a)(l) (2004). 
50. 18 U.S.C. § 1957(a) (2004). 
51. 18 U.S.C. § 1956(c)(2) (2004). 
52. See, e.g., OBERMAIER& MORVILLO, supra note 10, § 2A.02 (2001). 
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This distinction was made clear in United States v. Tarkaff, where 
Section 1956(a)(l) was applied successfully to a transaction occurring 
wholly abroad (i.e., a transfer of funds from Curacao to Israel arranged 
by the defendant while in lsrael).53 The defendant attempted to rely on 
United States v. Kramer, where the court refused to apply Section 
1956(a)(2) to a transfer of money between Switzerland and 
Luxembourg, since Section 1956(a)(2) required that the transfer cross a 
U.S. border.54 In Tarkaff, the Eleventh Circuit clarified the difference 
between the two statutes: 
Kramer does not control in this case, however, because Tarkoff was 
convicted under a different subsection of the money laundering statute 
(§ 1956(a)(l)(B)(i)) than the one at issue in Kramer. The difference 
between the two subsections is that violation of the subsection at issue 
in Kramer specifically requires a transfer of funds to or from the 
United States, see 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(2)(B)(i), whereas a violation of 
the subsection under which Tarkoff was convicted can occur so long 
as the defendant was involved in a "financial transaction."55 
Apparently, Tarka.ff (decided in February 2001) is the first case to apply 
the United States money laundering statutes to transactions occurring 
wholly abroad (and, indeed, the Eleventh Circuit relies on no 
precedent).56 It signals that the so-called "domestic money laundering" 
statute (§ 1956(a)(l)) is available for crimes committed anywhere, 
whether in the United States, offshore, or across a U.S. border. By 
doing so, the Tarka.ff decision would appear to have rendered Section 
1956(a)(2) somewhat superfluous.57 
Although not stated, it is possible that the Tarka.ff court was 
influenced by the extent of contact with the United States: the predicate 
crime giving rise to money laundering was domestic (mail fraud based 
53. United States v. Tarkoff, 242 F .3d 991 (11th Cir. 2001 ). 
54. United States v. Kramer, 73 F.3d 1067 (I Ith Cir. 1996). 
55. Tarkoff, 242 F.3d at 994, n.2. 
56. See Ian M. Comisky & Matthew D. Lee, Targeting International Money 
Laundering (Part 2): A Jurisdictional Reach Too Far, 12 J. INT'L TAX 18 (2001) 
(commenting that until Tarkoff, each case money laundering case involved a "substantial 
domestic nexus"). 
57. Section 1956(a)(l) has been used in other cases involving the transfer offunds to or 
from the United States. See, e.g., United States v. Quintero, 165 F.3d 831 (11th Cir.), cert. 
denied, 528 U.S. 963 (1999) (noting that count twenty-five was an indictment under section 
1956(a)(l), but involved the transfer of funds between the United States and Switzerland); 
see also United States v. Garcia, 37 F.3d 1359 (9th Cir. 1994) (charging defendant under 
both sections 1956(a)(l) and (a)(2) for transfer of illegal proceeds from a Swiss bank to a 
California bank). Recall, though, as mentioned supra note 45, that section 1956(a)(2) may 
be useful to prosecutors in that it does not explicitly require proof that the funds were 
proceeds of a specified unlawful activity if requisite scienter may be shown otherwise. 
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on Medicare fraud). Originally, the funds were transferred to Curacao 
from Miami; Tarkoff was a United States citizen and a lawyer, who had 
lied to the DOJ about the existence of the funds, and flew from the 
United States to Israel to help his client make the transfer from Curacao 
to Israel (where Tarkoffhimself also took a portion in payment).58 
It is unclear, therefore, whether a court would be equally eager to 
find jurisdiction if the case involved a less odious defendant, or a non-
U. S. citizen whose conduct only partly occurred in the United States. 
Nonetheless, Tarkoff demonstrates the willingness of the DOJ and the 
courts to prosecute cases on the fringe of the statute - even if such 
citizens are neither the transferor nor the direct or primary recipient of 
the funds. 
Transaction 
Further evidence that the cross-border money laundering statute is 
now subsumed by the general money laundering statute is the fact that 
the term 'monetary instrument' means: (i) coin or currency of the 
United States or of any other country, travelers' checks, personal 
checks, bank checks, and money orders, or (ii) investment securities or 
negotiable instruments, in bearer form or otherwise in such form that 
title thereto passes upon delivery. "59 By contrast, "financial 
transaction" is broadly defined in Section 1956( c )( 4) to include 
monetary instruments and other types of property as well:60 
(A) a transaction which in any way or degree affects interstate or 
foreign commerce (i) involving the movement of funds by wire or 
other means or (ii) involving one or more monetary instruments, or 
(iii) involving the transfer of title to any real property, vehicle, vessel, 
or aircraft, or (B) a transaction involving the use of a financial 
institution which is engaged in, or the activities of which affect, 
interstate or foreign commerce in any way or degree.61 
"Transaction" is defined broadly in Section 1956(c)(3) and includes a 
disposition by any means.62 The requirement that the transaction 
"affects interstate or foreign commerce" is a fairly low threshold.63 In 
Tarkoff, the court found "foreign commerce" to be affected, in part 
58. See Tarkoff, 242 F.3d at 992. 
59. 18 U.S.C. § 1956(c)(5) (2004). 
60. See United States v. Carr, 25 F.3d 1194, 1204 (3d Cir. 1994) (noting that this is the 
"only distinction" between sections 1956(a)(l) and 1956(a)(2)). 
61. 18 U.S.C. § 1956(c)(4) (2004). 
62. Id. § 1956(c)(3). 
63. Id. 
18
Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce, Vol. 31, No. 2 [2004], Art. 3
https://surface.syr.edu/jilc/vol31/iss2/3
2004] International Money Laundering . 245 
because the Israeli bank had to make calls to a bank in the United States 
in order to arrange transfer from Curacao.64 Finally, the term "financial 
institution" is also broadly defined to include not only banks and 
brokerages, but also travel agencies, car dealers, the U.S. Postal Service, 
and any other institution as the Secretary of the Treasury may 
determine. 65 
Thus, it is not possible to escape liability under Section 1956(a)(l) 
merely by using a foreign bank or conducting the transaction wholly 
outside the United States or in non-U.S. currency or using certain non-
monetary property (e.g., vehicles or real estate). The transfer or receipt 
of any funds, monetary instrument, real estate, vehicle, vessel, or 
aircraft in a transaction involving criminal proceeds qualifies. 
Section 1957 uses the term "monetary transaction," which is also 
narrower than "financial transaction." "Monetary transaction" is 
defined as: 
the deposit, withdrawal, transfer, or exchange, in or affecting interstate 
or foreign commerce, of funds or a monetary instrument (as defined in 
section 1956( c )( 5) of this title) by, through, or to a financial 
institution (as defined in section 1956 of this title), including any 
transaction that would be a financial transaction under section 
1956( c )( 4)(B) of this title, but such term does not include any 
transaction necessary to preserve a person's right to re~resentation as 
guaranteed by the sixth amendment to the Constitution. 6 
In other words, a "monetary transaction" is a "financial transaction" that 
moves "by, through or to a financial institution." 
Accordingly, prosecution under Section 1957 is available for 
transactions not involving a transfer through a bank or any other 
financial institution. As discussed above, this limitation could, in 
theory, preclude prosecution of anyone other than a U.S. citizen for 
such transaction occurring wholly outside the United States. 67 
Criminal Proceeds 
The crime of money laundering under Section 1956 or 1957 
requires that the financial transaction "involve" the proceeds of a 
64. Tarkoff, 242 F.2d at 995. 
65. See 18 U.S.C. § 1956(c)(6) (2004) (discussing the incorporation of the definition of 
"financial institution" from 31 U.S.C. § 5312(a)(2), which in tum incorporates 31 C.F.R. § 
103.l l(n)). 
66. 18 U.S.C. § 1957(f) (2004) (emphasis added). 
67. See supra text accompanying notes 31-32. 
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"specified unlawful activity" (i.e., the predicate crime ).68 The term 
"specified unlawful activity" is defined broadly in Section 1956( c )(7) to 
include numerous offenses, including drug dealing, murder-for-hire, 
arson, kidnapping, foreign bribery and FCP A violations, smuggling, 
counterfeiting, and various forms of fraud.69 
The requirements for a "financial transaction" (discussed above) 
should not be confused with the requirements that the transaction 
involve criminal proceeds. Funds, monetary instruments, real property, 
vehicles, vessels, or aircraft must be involved for the transaction to 
qualify as a "financial transaction," but need not themselves be 
criminally derived, if other items involved in the transaction (e.g., the 
items obtained in exchange for such funds) constitute proceeds of 
specified unlawful activity. In other words, a payment using legitimate 
funds made to, from, or within the United States may constitute money 
laundering if made in payment for weapons smuggled into a foreign 
country. 70 In this case, the weapons themselves would be viewed as the 
proceeds of specified unlawful activity (foreign smuggling) that are 
involved in a transaction that also involves a transfer of funds and, 
therefore, qualifies as a "financial transaction." 
Of particular concern to dealings in emerging markets is the 
potential that the assets of the new foreign partner that will be used in 
the international project may have derived from criminal activities, 
including activities which, in such a market, are commonplace and/or 
crimes that are not strictly enforced, but which constitute predicate 
offenses for purposes of U.S. money laundering nevertheless. Such 
potential offenses include smuggling, export control violations, 
corruption, tax evasion, and other forms of fraud. 71 Recent successes in 
applying the statute to the proceeds of foreign bribery and foreign tax 
evasion, discussed next, have enhanced such concerns. 
68. See supra text accompanying notes 45-46. This requirement is not explicit for 
Cross-Border Money Laundering, but is viewed as implicit. See note 46. 
69. 18 U.S.C. § 1956(c)(7) (2004). 
70. 18 U.S.C. § 1956(c)(7)(V) (2004). "The term specified unlawful activity 
means ... with respect to any financial transaction occurring in whole or in part in the United 
States, an offense against a foreign nation involving ... smuggling or export control 
violations involving .. . an item controlled on the United States Munitions List." Id. 
71. Id.§ 1956(c)(7)(B). Foreign smuggling (i.e., smuggling in violation of the laws of 
another state) is a predicate offense to money laundering under sections 1956 and 1957 if 
the financial transaction constituting the money laundering occurs "in whole or in part in the 
United States." Id. 
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Foreign Bribery 
Foreign bribery became a predicate offense to money laundering 
with the addition, in 1992, of "a felony violation of the Foreign Corrupt 
Practices Act" to the list of predicate offenses for money laundering. 72 
Until 1998, an FCP A violation required the use of the mails or other 
means of interstate commerce. Despite its implicit breadth, the 
requirement seemed to invite circumvention through the careful 
orchestration of payment schemes offshore. In 1998, the FCP A was 
amended to expand its reach to conduct of U.S. persons occurring 
wholly abroad and to reach the actions of other persons taking place in 
the United States (regardless of whether the "means of interstate 
commerce" are used).73 However, the FCPA was (and remains) limited 
to the specific conduct proscribed by its terms, which are largely 
independent of considerations of the anti-bribery laws of the foreign 
official's home country. 74 The Patriot Act expanded the foreign bribery 
predicate for money laundering beyond the limits of the FCP A, by 
amending Section 1956( c) to add the following to the list of "specified 
unlawful activities": 
(B) with respect to any financial transaction occurring in whole or in 
part in the United States, an offense against a foreign nation 
involving-... (iv) bribery of a public official, or the 
misappropriation, theft, or embezzlement of public funds by or for the 
benefit of a public official. .. 75 
Unlike the FCP A, there is no requirement that the act of bribery be 
72. Id. § 1956(c)(7)(D). 
73. 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 78dd-l(g), 78dd-2(a),(i), & 78dd-3(a) (West 2004). 
74. Id. § 78dd-l(a). Specifically, the FCPA proscribes any person within its scope 
(including in the case of a company, its officers, directors, employees, agents and 
stockholders acting on its behalf), from corruptly making "an offer, payment, promise to 
pay, or authorization of the payment of any money, or offer, gift or promise to give, or 
authorization of the giving of anything of value to ( 1) any foreign official, political party, or 
candidate for foreign public office for purposes of (A) (i) influencing any act or decision of 
such foreign official in his official capacity, (ii) inducing such foreign official to do or omit 
to do any act in violation of the lawful duty of such official, or (iii) securing any improper 
advantage; or (B) inducing such foreign official to use his influence with a foreign 
government or instrumentality, in order to assist such [entity] in obtaining or retaining 
business for or with, or directing business to, any person, subject to certain affirmative 
defenses and other limitations." Id. The FCPA does not apply, however, to conduct 
specifically authorized by the home country law of the foreign official. Id. § 78dd-(b). 
75. The legislative history of the Patriot Act makes clear that this language is intended 
to go beyond the FCPA and cover any foreign bribery. See, e.g., Congressional Record, 
October 25, 2001 (Senate), S10990-Sl 1060, at SI 1034. "For the first time, foreign 
corruption offenses such as bribery and misappropriation of funds by a public official will 
qualify as predicate offenses that can trigger a U.S. money laundering prosecution." Id. 
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committed either by a U.S. person or within the territory of the United 
States. Moreover, the new provision covers other forms of corruption 
(such as embezzlement). 
This predicate does not apply, however, to transactions occurring 
wholly abroad, even if within the extraterritorial scope of Section 1956 
and 1957. In other words, the broad foreign bribery predicate may not 
be used to prosecute financial transactions occurring wholly abroad, 
even if by U.S. persons, unless the foreign bribery qualifies as a 
violation of the FCP A. This exception is quite narrow. As Stein 
instructs, a transfer of funds across the U.S. border is considered to be 
"in part in the United States" even if the defendant ordered such transfer 
without setting foot in the United States. 76 
As an illustration of what is now covered, suppose the new foreign 
partner bribed a public official in its home country to obtain a 
government license, concession, or property, which was then transferred 
to the international project. This offense would not be covered by the 
FCP A, unless the act of bribery (or related acts) had been conducted in 
the United States or the new foreign partner had securities listed on a 
U.S. exchange. This offense is, however, sufficient for the new foreign 
bribery provision of Section 1956 introduced by the Patriot Act. As a 
result, anyone having the requisite knowledge of the bribe (discussed 
below) and "conducting" or "engaged in" such transfer may be subject 
to prosecution. Depending on how the transaction was pursued and 
structured, potential defendants may include not only the new foreign 
partner, the international project company, and the foreign employees 
(if the relevant acts occurred at least in part in the United States), but 
also the U.S. parent, the European subsidiary, and the U.S. employees. 
Foreign Tax Evasion 
Another major concern for U.S. companies doing business with 
new partners in emerging markets relates to commonplace practices and 
structures that may be employed by such partners in reaction to home 
country taxes. Such practices may grow out of irrational tax regimes 
applying high rates of tax, incomplete regulation, and limited or 
selective means of domestic enforcement. In recent years, numerous 
cases have reviewed the question as to whether evasion of foreign tax 
constitutes a scheme to defraud for purposes of mail or wire fraud under 
U.S. laws and, therefore, whether such foreign tax evasion may form a 
76. Stein, No. 93-375-Sec. "N", 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8471 (E.D. La. 1994). See 
supra text accompanying note 24. 
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predicate offense for money laundering. 77 
"Wire fraud" (or its complement, mail fraud) is often a predicate 
crime for money laundering. 78 The elements of wire (or mail) fraud are 
two-fold: (a) the existence of a scheme to defraud, and (b) the use of the 
"mails" or the "wires" for the purpose of executing the scheme.79 The 
term "wires" is construed broadly to include any telephone or electronic 
communication between the U.S. states or into or out of the U.S., and 
one case has gone so far as to include wire communications between 
two foreign cities (Montreal and Nassau) when made at the request of a 
U.S. citizen located in the United States.80 The wire fraud statute also 
has been used to prosecute fraud that was perpetrated solely abroad (in 
Croatia).81 Telephone communication by means other than a "wire" is 
even covered. 82 
Whether foreign tax evasion may constitute mail or wire fraud is a 
delicate question, as it implicates the common law "Revenue Rule," 
which generally prohibits the use of U.S. courts to enforce foreign tax 
laws.83 Notwithstanding some resistance based on the Revenue Rule, 
courts have generally accepted the notion that foreign tax evasion is 
within the ambit of mail or wire fraud and, therefore, is an appropriate 
predicate for money laundering. As discussed in more detail below, 
while a 1996 First Circuit case takes the opposite view, 84 more recent 
cases in the Second and Fourth Circuits are supportive.85 All of the 
cases involve smuggling of tobacco or alcohol to Canada in violation of 
Canadian tax and excise laws. Although these cases involve defendants 
77. 18 u.s.c. §§ 1341, 1343 (2004). 
78. See, e.g., Cleveland v. United States, 531 U.S. 12 (2000) (discussing mail fraud); 
United States v. Morelli, 169 F.3d 798, 806-07 (3d Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 820 
(1999) (discussing wire fraud); United States v. Smith, 44 F.3d 1259 (4th Cir. 1995) 
(discussing wire fraud); United States v. Taylor, 984 F.2d 298 (9th Cir. 1993) (discussing 
wire fraud). 
79. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1343 (2004). 
80. See United States v. Goldberg, 830 F.2d 459, 464 (3d Cir. 1997) (one judge 
dissenting). 
81. See United States v. Kim, 246 F .3d 186 (2d Cir. 2001 ). "There would seem to be no 
logical reason for holding that Congress intended to punish those who cause the violation of 
a law regulating and protecting foreign commerce only when they act within the borders of 
the United States or that Congress is powerless to protect foreign commerce and those who 
engage in foreign commerce from intentionally injurious acts, simply because those acts 
occur outside our borders" (citations omitted). Id. at 189. 
82. See United States v. Foley, 683 F .2d 273, 280 (8th Cir. 1982). 
83. See Kovatch, Recognizing Foreign Tax Judgments: An Argument for the 
Revocation of the Revenue Rule, 22 HOUSTON J. INT'LL. 265, 268-71 (2000). 
84. See infra note 86. 
85. See infra notes 87-100. 
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who themselves evaded taxes, they are instructive to potential liability 
for business partners of foreign tax evaders. 
In 1996, the First Circuit Court of Appeals held in United States v. 
Boots that foreign tax and custom frauds are not schemes to defraud 
within the meaning of the wire fraud statute. 86 In reviewing a 
smuggling scheme involving transportation of tobacco from Maine to 
Canada, the court applied the Revenue Rule and reversed the wire fraud 
conviction. 87 
In 1997, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals criticized Boots in 
United States v. Trapilo, stating "that a scheme to defraud the Canadian 
government of tax revenue is cognizable under the federal wire fraud 
statute.88 As in Boots, the Trapilo case involves several defendants 
charged in connection with alleged smuggling of tobacco and liquor 
products to Canada across an Indian reservation in New York State. 89 
In addition, the Trapilo opinion addressed money laundering charges 
with wire fraud as a predicate offense. 90 The Second Circuit focused on 
the plain language of the statute, and found that the prohibited conduct 
is a "scheme to defraud" utilizing the wires, regardless of the identity 
and location of the victim or the ultimate success of the scheme in 
violating Canadian law.91 By shifting the focus of the inquiry from the 
need to find an actual violation of Canadian law to a determination of 
the mere existence of a scheme to do so, the court relieved itself of the 
obligation to pass judgment on matters of Canadian law, with the result 
that the Revenue Rule was not implicated and the defendant's conduct 
was amenable to action under Section 1343.92 The court cited a number 
of cases that focused on the intent to defraud under United States laws, 
and defendants' convictions were upheld regardless of whether the 
86. United States v. Boots, 80 F.3d 580, 588-89 (1st Cir. 1996), cert. denied 519 U.S. 
905 (1996). 
87. Id. 
88. United States v. Trapilo, 130 F.3d 547, 553 (2d Cir. 1997), cert denied 525 U.S. 
812 (1998). 
89. Trapilo, 130 F.3d at 549. 
90. Id. 
91. Trapilo, 130 F.3d at 553. "The simple fact that the scheme to defraud involves a 
foreign sovereign's revenue laws does not draw our inquiry into forbidden waters reserved 
exclusively to the legislative and the executive branches of our government. We concern 
ourselves only with what has been expressly forbidden by statute-the use of the wires in 
the scheme to defraud. Whether our decision today indirectly assists our Canadian 
neighbors in keeping smugglers at bay or assists them in the collection of taxes, is not our 
Court's concern ... Our goal is simply to vindicate the intended purpose of the statute, that 
is, 'to prevent the use of [our telecommunications systems] in furtherance of fraudulent 
enterprises."' Id. 
92. Trapilo, 130 F. 3d at 552. 
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attempt to defraud was successful. 93 The court further cited cases in 
which wire fraud convictions were upheld in schemes to defraud foreign 
victims. 94 The Second Circuit mentioned the Boots analysis of the 
revenue ruling, but did not provide textual analysis on this point of the 
First Circuit's decision.95 In addition, the widely-reported Bank of New 
York case involving Russian funds resulted in the filing of indictments 
against bank employees in February 2000 for money laundering 
predicated on wire fraud, alleging that the defendants engaged in a 
scheme to defraud the Russian Government of tax revenue.96 
More recently, on July 18, 2003, the Court of Appeals for the 
Fourth Circuit in United States v. Pasquantino, upon rehearing en bane 
rejected Boots and followed Trapilo.97 Pasquantino involved a similar 
fact pattern, where several defendants were involved in the smuggling 
of alcohol to Canada in violation of Canadian tax and excise laws and 
were charged with wire fraud.98 The Court in Pasquantino criticized 
Boots and rejected the argument that convictions for wire fraud would 
be equivalent to enforcing the tax laws of Canada in violation of the 
revenue rule. It stated that: 
93. See id. In each of these cited cases, the object of the scheme to defraud was a clear 
violation of United States law. Trapilo, 130 F.3d at 552. The Trapilo court did not directly 
address the issue raised in Boots of determining whether the act committed as part of the 
alleged scheme was illegal under the law of a foreign country. Id. The cases cited in 
Trapilo include: United States v. Helmsley, 941 F.2d 71, 94 (2d Cir. 1991) (upholding 
convictions of mail and wire fraud notwithstanding that the prosecution failed to prove taxes 
were actually due because the court focused on the .scheme, and not its success); United 
States v. DeFiore, 720 F.2d 757, 762 (2d Cir. 1983) (holding that the use of wires in 
furtherance of scheme to defraud New York of cigarette taxes falls within the federal wire 
fraud statute). 
94. See Trapilo, 130 F.3d at 552, citing United States v. Gilboe, 684 F.2d 235 (2d Cir. 
1982) (involving a scheme which defrauded a corporation owned by the People's Republic 
of China by fraudulent representation that non-existent ships would be available to transport 
grain) and United States v. Goldberg, 830 F.2d 459 (3d Cir. 1987) (involving wire transfers 
defrauding Canadians after stolen property passed from the United States to Canada). 
95. Trapilo, 130 F.3d at 550, n. 4 (quoting the RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN 
RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 483, REPORTERS NOTE at 613 (1987) that the 
rationale for not enforcing tax judgments is largely obsolete). 
96. United States v. Berlin, et al., 99 Cr. 914 (SWK). See United States v. 
$15,270,885.69 Formerly on Deposit in Account No. 89000261137, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
12602 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (discussing the indictment in an ensuing forfeiture proceeding). The 
defendants ended up pleading guilty to conspiracy charges in exchange for their 
cooperation. Id. See generally Larry Neumeister, Ex-Bank of NY Exec Pleads Guilty, 
ASSOCIATED PRESS, Feb. 16, 2000, available at 2000 WL 14320753. 
97. United States v. Pasquantino, 336 F.3d 321 (4th Cir. 2003) (affirming Boots and 
holding that "a scheme to defraud a foreign government of tax revenues is not cognizable 
under the wire fraud statute." Id. at 295. 
98. Id. at 292. 
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In making this argument, the Defendants, and the First Circuit in 
Boots for that matter, miss the critical point that prosecution for 
violation of the federal wire statute, even when the subject of the wire 
fraud scheme involved is certain tax revenue due a foreign sovereign, 
does nothing civilly or criminally to enforce any tax judgments or 
claims that the foreign sovereign has or may later obtain against the 
defendant. Neither does such prosecution enforce the revenue laws of 
the foreign sovereign involved. Rather, such prosecution seeks only 
to enforce the federal wire fraud statute for the singular goal of 
vindicating our government's substantial interest in preventing our 
nation's interstate wire communications systems from being used in 
furtherance of criminal fraudulent enterprises. 99 
The principles articulated in Trapilo and Pasquantino were echoed 
again in 2004 in United States v. Fountain. 100 
In short, the Trapilo, Fountain, and Pasquantino cases establish a 
basis for concluding that if the new foreign partner contributes funds to 
the international project that are the proceeds of foreign tax evasion, all 
participants in the transaction and future transactions utilizing those 
same funds may be held liable if the new foreign partner utilized the 
U.S. mails or wires (broadly defined) in perpetrating tax evasion and if 
the participants acted with the requisite knowledge of unlawful activity. 
The U.S. money laundering laws do not require a conviction of the 
predicate offense, but rather only evidence (even circumstantial 
evidence) that the transaction involves proceeds that derive from it. 101 
For example, a case may be built around the direct links between the 
unlawful activity of the new foreign partner and the assets contributed 
to the international project, such as the channeling of money from a 
concealed offshore account to the international project. In other 
respects, a prosecutor may attempt to rely on evidence that the new 
foreign partner was engaged in systematic tax evasion. 
Moreover, the courts have held that, due to the fungibility of 
money, it is sufficient to prove that funds came from an account in 
which proceeds were commingled with other funds. 102 This 
commingling rule has significant implications for dealings with new 
business partners. Once the tainted funds of the new foreign partner are 
commingled with clean funds earned by or contributed to the 
99. Pasquantino, 336 F .3d at 299-300. 
100. Fountain v. United States, 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 1117 (2d Cir. 2004) (involving 
the same Canadian tax evasion scheme as Trapilo ). 
101. See generally the discussion of the evidentiary requirements in Chapter 2A; 
GREDD ET AL., MONEY LAUNDERING § 2A.02( 1 ], at 2A-24. 
102. United States v. Garcia, 37 F.3d 1359, 1365 (9th Cir. 1994). 
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international project company, all transactions involving the 
international project company's funds may be viewed as transactions 
involving the proceeds of specified unlawful activity. 
Knowledge of Illegality 
The foregoing analysis illustrates the breadth of potential liability 
for any person involved in the transaction that itself involves the tainted 
funds or other proceeds of specified unlawful activity. For criminal 
liability to attach, however, the defendant must have participated with 
requisite knowledge as discussed in this and subsequent sections. The 
knowledge elements are vital to mitigating liability. 
U.S. money laundering laws require knowledge that the funds 
represent proceeds from an unlawful activity (not specifically a 
"specified unlawful activity," as described above). The statute defines 
this to mean: "the person knew that the property involved in the 
transaction represented proceeds from some form, though not 
necessarily which form, of activity that constitutes a felony under State, 
Federal or foreign law ... "103 Foreign tax evasion, bribery, and other 
offenses may be considered "felonies" for this ~urpose if they are 
punishable by confinement of more than one year. 1 A defendant need 
not know that the crimes are indeed felonies. 105 Moreover, a defendant 
need not know the specific crimes from which the funds derive. 106 
For corporate defendants, knowledge may be inferred, under the 
principle of "collective knowledge," from the totality of information 
learned by employees in the course of their employment. 107 The 
103. 18 U.S.C. § 1956(c)(l) (2004) (emphasis added). 
104. See U.S.S.G. § 2Ll.2, 18 U.S.C. § 2Ll.2 (2004) (defining a "felony" for purposes 
of sentencing); see, e.g., Russian Criminal Code, art. 199 (providing that tax evasion is 
punishable by confinement for up to 5 years); see id., art. 193 (providing that capital flight is 
punishable by confinement for up to 3 years); see id., art. 290 (providing that payment of a 
bribe is punishable by confinement for up to 5 years). 
105. United States v. Hill, 167 F.3d 1055, 1066-68 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 
827 (1999) (citing legislative history, rejecting the "I thought it was only a misdemeanor" 
defense in a case involving the laundering of gambling proceeds). 
106. United States v. Reiss, 186 F.3d 149, 154 (2d Cir. 1999) (finding defendant guilty 
of money laundering though he did not know the specific criminal source of the funds); 
United States v. Hawkey, 148 F.3d 920, 925 (8th Cir. 1998); United States v. Bornfield, 145 
F.3d 1123, 1132 (10th Cir. 1998) (holding in each case that the defendant only needs to 
know that property is "criminally derived" and not the specific criminal activity). 
107. United States v. Bank of New England, N.A., 821 F.2d 844, 855 (1st Cir. 1987) 
(finding proper an instruction to the jury that "the knowledge of [each] individual employee 
acting within the scope of their employment is imputed to the bank" in a case involving 
failure by bank to report withdrawals in excess of $10,000); United States v. Penagaricano-
Soler, 911 F.2d 833, 843 (1st Cir. 1990); see also, Tania Brief and Terrell Mcsweeny, 
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principle of "collective knowledge" effectively imposes upon a 
corporation (be it the U.S. parent, the European subsidiary, or the 
international project company) a duty to carefully collect and evaluate 
the totality of information and rumors learned by its employees about 
the new foreign partner's activities and sources of funds. 
In addition, U.S. courts repeatedly have found circumstantial 
evidence sufficient to prove a defendant's subjective knowledge of the 
unlawful source of funds (e.g., when a defendant knew that the provider 
of the funds engaged in criminal activity). 108 While it is clear that 
showing a defendant "should have known" about the illegal source or 
acted in "reckless disregard" of same is insufficient, courts also have 
found knowledge to exist where a defendant was "willfully blind."109 
Simply put, willful blindness is deliberate ignorance -- the sense that "I 
do not want to know about this" and ignoring or not investigating 
certain "flags of suspicion."110 Under one formulation, a showing of 
willful blindness of an operative fact will suffice if: "the defendant was 
aware of a high probability of the existence of the fact, yet deliberately 
avoided lea.ming whether the fact existed, with the conscious purpose of 
evading criminal liability, unless the defendant genuinely believed that 
the fact did not exist."111 
Corporate Criminal Liability, 40 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 337, 347 (2003). "The 'collective 
knowledge' doctrine imputes to a corporation the sum knowledge of all or some of its 
employees-aggregating individual employee's knowledge for the purpose of creating the 
necessary guilty intent for the corporation. Thus, a corporation may be liable even if there is 
no single employee at fault. In this way, the collective knowledge doctrine prevents 
corporations from evading liability by compartmentalizing and dividing employee duties." 
Id. [footnotes omitted]. 
108. United States v. Heaps, 39 F.3d 479, 484 (4th Cir. 1994) (finding circumstantial 
evidence that defendant should have known that the money wired to her was drug money 
because the defendant knew that the party wiring her money was a drug dealer); United 
States v. Prince, 214 F.3d 740, 760 (6th Cir. 2000) (holding that circumstantial evidence 
may be used to establish defendant's knowledge); United States v. Smith, 223 F.3d 554, 577 
(7th Cir. 2000), United States v. Wynn, 61 F.3d 921, 926 (D.C. Cir. 1995), United States v. 
Macko, 994 F.2d 1526, 1533 (11th Cir. 1993), United States v. Isabel, 945 F.2d 1193, 1202 
(1st Cir. 1991) (holding in each case that circumstantial evidence was sufficient to support a 
conviction). 
109. See United States v. Bader, 956 F.2d 708, 710 (7th Cir. 1992); see also S. Rep. 
No. 99-433, at 6-8 (1986). 
110. See United States v. Smith, 46 F.3d 1223, 1237 (1st Cir. 1999) (finding that the 
defendant was willfully blind when he left the room during a discussion of the scheme 
saying, "I don't want to hear this"); United States v. Coviello, 225 F.3d 54, 70 (1st Cir. 
2000), cert. denied, 532 U.S. 1102 (2001). 
111. United States v. Ebert, 178 F.3d 1287, *32-33 (4th Cir. 1999); see Robin 
Charlow, Willful Ignorance and Criminal Culpability, 70 Tex. L. Rev. 1351, 1413-18 
(1992); cf, e.g., United States v. Baron, 94 F.3d 1312, 1318 n.3 (9th Cir. 1996); United 
States v. Cunningham, 83 F.3d 218, 221 (8th Cir. 1996); United States v. Whittington, 26 
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This doctrine allows a jury to impute knowledge to a defendant 
who strongly suspects (but does not know for sure) the existence of the 
operative fact that makes his conduct unlawful and deliberately closes 
his eyes to the existence of that fact in an attempt to avoid criminal 
liability. Knowledge of "rumors" about potential criminal activity or 
associations with criminals and a failure to investigate them, may 
constitute willful blindness. 112 The doctrine of willful blindness applies 
equally to corporate defendants. 113 
Accordingly, knowledge of the illegal source of the new foreign 
partner's contributions to the international project may be inferred if 
there is sufficient circumstantial evidence that a defendant knew of such 
illegal source or if such defendant is found to have ignored and failed to 
investigate "red flags" or rumors, or knew that the new foreign partner 
engaged in criminal activity. Therefore, any information that comes to 
the U.S. parent, the European subsidiary, the international project 
company, or any of the employees or agents regarding potential tax 
evasion, bribery or other illegal conduct of the new foreign partner or 
their principals, associations with organized crime figures or with 
potentially corrupt government officials, should be promptly 
investigated. 
Knowledge of Intent to Conceal 
The final element in the analysis under Section 1956 is whether a 
defendant knew "that the transaction is designed in whole or in 
part ... to conceal or disguise the nature, the location, the source, the 
ownershif, or the control of the proceeds of specified unlawful 
activity." 14 As noted in Table 2 above, this element is not required for 
violations of Section 1957. To satisfy this element, a defendant need 
not intend the concealment or disguise; he need only know that this was 
F.3d 456, 461-62 (4th Cir. 1993); United States v. Fingado, 934 F.2d 1163, 1167 (10th Cir. 
1991); United States v. Giovannetti, 919 F.2d 1223, 1228 (7th Cir. 1990); United States v. 
Mang Sun Wong, 884 F.2d 1537, 1543 (2d Cir. 1989); United States v. Caminos, 770 F.2d 
361, 365 (3d Cir. 1985): United States v. Restrapo-Granda, 575 F.2d 524, 528 n.2 (5th Cir. 
1978). 
112. United States v. Antzoulatos, 962 F.2d 720, 727 (7th Cir. 1992) (finding that the 
defendant turned a blind eye to rumors of a friend's involvement with drug sales and close 
relationship with drug dealers). 
113. Brief & Mcsweeny, supra note 107. "Corporations can be criminally liable for 
deliberately disregarding criminal activity. The 'willful blindness' doctrine is usually 
applied to situations where a corporate agent became suspicious of a criminal violation, but 
deliberately took no action to mitigate or investigate further in order to avoid culpability." 
Id. [footnotes omitted]. 
114. 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(l)(B)(i) (2004). 
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the intention of the perpetrator of the underlying crime. Such 
knowledge may also be proven circumstantially or from "willful 
blindness."115 One court has gone so far as to say that proof of 
knowledge of the intent to conceal or disguise the source of funds is 
obvious, if the first knowledge element is met, since any person 
knowingly using illegal proceeds would obviously know of the intent to 
conceal the source.116 However, some courts recognize this second 
knowledge element as distinguishing transactions in furtherance of the 
overall money laundering scheme from ordinary spending of tainted 
funds. 117 According to this view, payment of ordinary business 
expenses with tainted funds does not constitute money laundering in 
violation of Section 1956; rather, it is a violation of the "money 
spending" proscribed by Section 1957.118 
It is difficult to predict how this element of the money laundering 
offense will apply to a defendant. Liability would largely depend on 
how disbursements from the new foreign partner to the international 
project company, and onward disbursements, are made. The court in 
United States v. Garcia-Emmanuel suggested certain indicia that a court 
could consider to determine whether a scheme is designed to conceal or 
disguise. 119 The elements the court mentioned include among others: 
• unusual secrecy surrounding the transaction; 
• structuring the transaction to avoid attention; 
• depositing illegal profits in the bank account of a legitimate 
business; 
• highly irregular features of the transaction; 
• using third parties to conceal the real owners; and 
• a series of unusual financial moves culminating in the 
transaction. 120 
These indicia of intent to conceal and disguise may be overcome by 
avoiding complicated financial structures and through reasonable due 
diligence, investigation, and disclosure. (See recommendations in 
115. United States v. Campbell, 977 F.2d 854 (4th Cir. 1992). 
116. United States v. Conley, 833 F.Supp. 1121, 1146 n.17 (W.D. Pa. 1993), vacated 
and remanded on other grounds, 37 F.3d 970 (3d Cir. 1994). 
117. See, e.g., United States v. Brown, 186 F.3d 661, 668 (5th Cir. 1999) (commenting 
that the money laundering statute, section 1956, should not have turned into section 1957, 
the money spending statute which does not require any intent or design to conceal and, 
therefore, captures any knowing spending of tainted funds, including paying legitimate 
business expenses). 
118. Brown, 186 F.3d at 668. 
119. United States v. Garcia-Emmanuel, 14 F.3d 1469, 1475-76 (10th Cir. 1994). 
120. Id. 
30
Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce, Vol. 31, No. 2 [2004], Art. 3
https://surface.syr.edu/jilc/vol31/iss2/3
2004] International · Money Laundering 257 
Section III below.) 
Section 2314 (Transportation of Stolen Money) 
In addition to indictments under Sections 1956 and 1957, a money 
laundering case may also proceed with an indictment under Section 
2314 (transportation of stolen money) as a separate or predicate 
offense. 121 Under Section 2314: 
[W]hoever transports, transmits, or transfers in interstate or foreign 
commerce any goods, wares, merchandise, or money, of value of 
$5,000 or more, knowing the same to have been stolen, converted or 
taken by fraud ... shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more 
than 10 years or both. 122 
Under the statute, it is illegal to transport (or wire) fraudulently-
obtained funds in foreign commerce (i.e., into or out of the United 
States). Therefore, if any part of the tainted funds of the new foreign 
partner moves through the United States, those persons responsible for 
such movement (and anyone conspiring with them or assisting them in 
such movement of funds) may be in violation of Section 2314, as long 
as they "knew" that the funds were the proceeds of foreign tax evasion 
or other fraud. Unlike Section 1956(a)(2), which similarly addresses 
transfers across U.S. borders, Section 2314 does not require knowledge 
of any intent to conceal and, therefore, is more akin to Section 1957. 
Moreover, Section 2314 captures transactions at a lower threshold (at 
least $5,000 in value), as well as transfers that do not involve a financial 
institution. 
Penalties under Section 2314 are similar to those under Section 
1957. The maximum confinement penalty is like that of Section 1957 
(ten years), half the maximum term prescribed by Section 1956. In 
addition, Section 2314 was amended in 1994 to substitute the outdated 
maximum fine (formerly, $10,000) with the phrase "under this title."123 
The maximum fine is now $250,000 (individual) or $500,000 
(organization) or, up to twice the defendant's gross gain (or the victim's 
gross loss) on the transaction, if such calculation does not unduly 
121. See United States v. Lovett, 964 F.2d 1029, 1042 (10th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 
506 U.S. 857 (1992) (holding that because transportation of stolen money qualified as a 
predicate offense ("specified unlawful activity") for purposes of sections 1956 and 1957, it 
is clear that Congress intended them to be separate offenses). 
122. 18 U.S.C. § 2314 (2004). 
123. 18 U.S.C. § 2314 (2004); see also Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement 
Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, § 330016, 108 Stat. 1796 (codified as amended 42 U.S.C. 
§ 13701 (1994)). 
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complicate the proceeding. 124 
Section 1962 (RICO) 
Finally, if the new foreign partner is found to have engaged in a 
"pattern of racketeering activity," their investment and interest in the 
international project may be found to be in violation of Section 1962(a) 
or Section 1962(b ), the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations 
(RICO) statute. A "pattern of racketeering activity" may be established 
by as few as two counts of wire fraud or money laundering. A RICO 
violation may also form the basis for private civil liability, although it 
has been recently held that the courts will not entertain civil RICO 
actions brought by foreign governments for revenue lost from evasion 
of their tax laws.125 
Ill. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR MITIGATING RISK 
The breadth of the U.S. money laundering laws indicates the 
importance of appropriate measures to mitigate the risk of violation, 
particularly for companies engaging in business transactions with new 
foreign partners, and particularly in emerging markets or elsewhere, 
where good business practices are not well-established and little is 
known about such partners and their activities. As discussed above, if a 
predicate offense was established, a defendant's risk of liability would 
turn on his knowledge of the new foreign partner's misdeeds. Such 
knowledge could be inferred from a failure by a defendant to investigate 
his suspicions, and his knowledge of any efforts to "conceal" the source 
of funds (e.g., via an unusually strict confidentiality agreement or a 
complicated financial structure). Accordingly, the risk of liability may 
be mitigated through due diligence and disclosure. As a starting point, a 
professional investigator should be employed to conduct a background 
check on the new foreign partner and its · source of funds. If there is a 
basis for some suspicion, the investigation should seek detailed 
information as to, e.g.: 
• the identity and background of the new foreign partner and 
any individuals beneficially owning or controlling the new 
foreign partner and the entities that the new foreign partner 
will designate for participation in the international project; 
124. 18 U.S.C §§ 3571(b)(3), (c)(3), & (d) (2004). 
125. See, e.g., European Community v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 497 
(2d Cir. 2004); Attorney General of Canada v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Holdings, Inc., 268 
F.3d 103 (2d Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1000, 154 L. Ed. 2d 394, 123 S. Ct. 513 
(2002). 
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• the business purposes for inclusion of such individuals in 
the international project (i.e., the commercial value they 
add); 
• the principal businesses of the participating entities; 
• the sources of the funds in the account from which the 
funds for the international project are to be transferred; and 
• the same information with respect to all affiliates that the 
new foreign partner plans to involve in the international 
project (contractors, purchasers, or suppliers). 
Adequate due diligence will be of paramount importance in order 
for the U.S. parent to obtain reasonable comfort that the resources 
contributed by the new foreign partner are, in fact, clean. However, 
disclosures of this kind may prove difficult for the new foreign partner 
to accept, as they may view them as invasive and unusual. In such case, 
the U.S. parent and European subsidiary may agree to preserve the 
confidentiality regarding the sources and ownership of the new foreign 
partner's resources. To further allay discomfort, particularly if the new 
foreign partner and the U.S. parent are competitors, they may agree to 
appoint a neutral and trusted third party to review the necessary 
information and make certain certifications to the U.S. parent. 
If the results of these inquiries are acceptable and the parties decide 
to proceed, then protective measures, tailored to the specifics of the 
international project and planned transfers of funds, should be adopted 
and implemented. Such measures may include the following: 
• The international project agreements should include 
representations and warranties by the new foreign partner as 
to the identity of each of their principals, the scope of their 
business activities, and their sources of funds. 
• Strict procedures should be established within the 
international project company to monitor outflows to ensure 
that they are for legitimate business expenses to reputable 
third parties. 
• Particular scrutiny should be applied to payments to any 
entity affiliated with the new foreign partner. 
• Should any rumors or other "flags of suspicion" regarding 
the activities of the new foreign partner come the U.S. 
parent's attention, the U.S. parent would have the right to 
investigate them, and the new foreign partner would be 
under an obligation to cooperate. 
• Corporate procedures should be established within the U.S. 
parent, the European subsidiary (and any other affiliate of 
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the U.S. parent involved in the international project) for 
reporting to the U.S. parent's management any information 
or rumor learned regarding any possible criminal activity of 
the new partner or any other investors, partners, suppliers, 
or contractors involved in the international project, and for 
investigating such information and rumors. 
• The international project agreements should include 
escape/termination rights for the U.S. parent and the 
European subsidiary, should any investigation identify 
wrongdoing. 
• Exclusions should be carved into any confidentiality 
agreements related to the international project, so that the 
U.S. parent and the European subsidiary may make 
disclosures regarding the source of funds as necessary or 
appropriate in connection with any government 
investigation or judicial proceeding. 
• The business purposes for complicated transactional 
structuring should be clearly documented and supported by 
sound tax and/or commercial strategies. 
• Payments to third parties should be made directly to the 
intended beneficiaries and not to intermediaries. 
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